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INTRODUCTION 
 Persons institutionalized in psychiatric institutions and facilities for persons 
with intellectual disabilities have always been hidden from view.1 Facilities were 
often constructed far from major urban centers, availability of transportation to 
such institutions was often limited, and those who were locked up were, to the 
public, faceless and seen as less than human.2 Although there were sporadic 
exposés in the nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century that attempted to 
shed light on the way these individuals were being forced to live,3 it was not until 
the civil rights revolution reached psychiatric hospitals and facilities for persons 
with intellectual disabilities in the early 1970s that there was any true public 
awareness of the conditions in such facilities.4 This increased recognition of the 
deplorable conditions which were the norm then led to an “explosion” of litigation on 
behalf of those in psychiatric hospitals or facilities for developmental disabilities, 
further raising awareness in the public and the courts nationwide.5 
                                                          
*  Professor Emeritus of Law, New York Law School. Founding Director, International Mental Disability 
Law Reform Project; Founding Director, Online Mental Disability Law Program; Co-founder, Mental 
Disability Law and Policy Associates. A.B., Rutgers University; J.D. Columbia University School of 
Law. 
** Staff Attorney, Disability Rights New York’s Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental 
Illness (PAIMI) Program; Association, Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates. J.D. New York 
Law School, M.A. (Mental Disability Law Studies) New York Law School. 
1  For a graphic example, see Mental Disability Rights Int'l, Hidden Suffering: Romania's Segregation 
and Abuse of Infants and Children with Disabilities (2006), 
http://www.disabilityrightsintl.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/romania-May-9-final_ withphotos.pdf 
(reporting on human rights abuses against children with disabilities in institutions in Romania). 
2  See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 43 (2000); see also 
Evelyn W. Lusthaus, Involuntary Euthanasia and Current Attempts to Define Persons with Mental 
Retardation as Less Than Human, 23 MENTAL RETARDATION 148, 148 (1985). 
3  See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 3-2.2, 
at 3-15 to 3-19 (3d ed. 2016) (discussing work of Dorothea Dix, E.P.W. Packard and Albert Deutsch). 
4  See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the Mentally 
Disabled: The Last Frontier?, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1249, 1250–51 (1987). 
5  See generally Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, “You That Hide Behind Walls”: The 
Relationship Between the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Convention 
Against Torture and the Treatment of Institutionalized Forensic Patients, in TORTURE AND ILL-
TREATMENT IN HEALTH- CARE SETTINGS: A COMPILATION 195 (Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law Ctr. on 
Humanitarian Law ed., 2013); see also Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights and Institutional 
Forensic Psychiatry: The Core Issues, in THE USE OF COERCIVE MEASURES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIC 
CARE: LEGAL, ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 9 (Birgit Völlm & Norbert Nedopil eds., 2016).  
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However, “[m]uch of [this] case law ignores forensic patients entirely.”6 By 
and large (although not exclusively),7 the facilities that were the subject of this 
litigation (and the concomitant press scrutiny)8 were facilities that mostly housed 
patients who had never been charged with or tried on criminal charges—a fact that 
is, interestingly and ironically, discordant with the false “ordinary common sense”9 
belief held by many in society which posits that “[m]ost mentally ill individuals are 
dangerous and frightening [and] are invariably more dangerous than non-mentally 
ill persons.”10  
Even in this hidden world of those institutionalized because of psychiatric disability 
(or alleged disability), forensic patients – mostly those awaiting incompetency-to-
stand trial determinations, those found permanently incompetent to stand trial, 
those . . . acquitted by reason of insanity, and, in some jurisdictions, individuals 
transferred from correctional facilities – [have always] remain[ed] the most hidden.11  
There has been little dignity present either in the conditions of the institutions in 
which such individuals have been housed or in the treatment that they have 
received.12 
Given their involvement with the criminal justice system and the mental 
health system simultaneously, this population has always been doubly stigmatized. 
Almost twenty-five years ago, one of the authors (MLP) wrote: “In the criminal 
                                                          
6  Michael L. Perlin, “Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain”: Considering the Sexual 
Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in 
Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 488 (2008). See also Maya Sabatello, Where Have the Rights of Forensic 
Patients Gone?, 109 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 77, 78 (2015) (“[F]orensic patients . . . remained largely 
invisible throughout the drafting process [of the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities [CRPD]”). On the CRPD in general, see infra text accompanying notes 132–70. 
7  See, e.g., Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1201–02 (N.D. Ohio 1974); see also Perlin, supra note 6, 
at 488 (“Of the important [first generation right-to-treatment institutional conditions cases], forensic 
patients were part of the plaintiff class only in the Ohio case of Davis v. Watkins.”). For a full discussion 
of Davis, see generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 7-3.2, at 7-7673 to 7-7876. 
8  For the role of the press, see Paul Davis, Wyatt v. Stickney: Did We Get It Right This Time?, 35 L. & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 143, 153 (2011). 
9  See Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism Through 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community Integration, 22 TEMPLE POL. & C.R. 
L. REV. 1, 38 (2012) (“[Ordinary common sense] is self-referential and non-reflective (‘I see it that way, 
therefore everyone sees it that way; I see it that way, therefore that’s the way it is’).”). 
10  Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 683, 724 n.220 (2003). 
11  See Perlin & Schriver, supra note 5, at 196; see also Perlin, supra note 5 (noting that forensic patients 
have traditionally been hidden from public view, the legal system, and the mental-health system). 
12  See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN,  A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND 
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 7 (2013);  Michael L. Perlin, Understanding the Intersection Between 
International Human Rights and Mental Disability Law: The Role of Dignity, in THE ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE STUDIES 191 (Bruce Arrigo & Heather Bersot eds., 
2013). This is not solely a US-based issue. On the disregard for the dignity of forensic patients in 
Austria, see, for example, Independent Monitoring Committee for the Implementation of the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Forensic Commitment-Statement on the Current 
Situation and Prevention at 4–5 (Jan. 19, 2015) (discussing “a disregard for dignity”). 
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justice system, the mentally disabled were doubly cursed as ‘mad’ and ‘bad’, and 
were regularly consigned to lifetime commitments in maximum security facilities.”13 
Attitudes remain the same today.14 Forensic patients face stigma both from their 
status as “defendant” and as being “mentally ill.”15 
            For decades, any person with a mental disability involved in the criminal 
process at any level was automatically and permanently housed in a maximum 
security forensic hospital, from which there was virtually no exit route (other than 
death). 16 The US Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Jackson v. Indiana17—on paper, 
at least18—limited the length of time that a forensic person who was not likely to 
regain his competency to stand trial could be housed in such a facility,19 unless 
                                                          
13  Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism”, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 373, 398–99 (1992) (quoting, in part, Ellen 
Hochstedler, Twice-Cursed? The Mentally Disordered Criminal Defendant, 14 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 251 
(1987)). 
14  See, e.g., James D. Livingston, Katherine R. Rossier & Simon N. Verdun-Jones, ‘Forensic’ Labelling: An 
Empirical Assessment of Its Effects on Self-Stigma for People with Severe Mental Illness, 188 
PSYCHIATRY RES. 115, 116 (2011). 
15  The stigma that forensic patients face was recognized by the Supreme Court as long ago as 1966, in 
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 114–15 (1966) (differences between civil and forensic facilities 
sufficient to require procedural protections for the individuals subject to placement decisions), as 
discussed in Roy E. Pardee III, Fear and Loathing in Louisiana: Confining the Sane Dangerous Insanity 
Acquittee,  36 ARIZ. L. REV. 223, 246 n.237 (1994). 
16  See A. Louis McGarry, Demonstration and Research in Competency for Trial and Mental Illness: Review 
and Preview, 49 B.U. L. REV. 46, 50 n.20 (1969) (reporting that more men committed as incompetent to 
stand trial “had left Bridgewater as a result of death than all other avenues combined”). 
17  406 U.S. 715, 720 (1972). 
18   Incredibly, Jackson continues to be ignored by about half the states. See Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring 
Competency to Stand Trial, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 921, 941 (1985); see also Ellen C. Wertlieb, Individuals 
with Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System: A Review of the Literature, 18 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 
332, 336 (1991). Winick’s research has been updated in Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? 
Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1, 9 (1993) (explaining that a decade after Winick published his article, Jackson remained 
“ignored [and] circumvented.”); see also Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact 
of the ADA on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 
193, 204 (2000)  (“[M]ore than half the states allow for the indefinite commitment of incompetent-to-
stand-trial defendants, in spite of Jackson's specific language outlawing this practice.”); Andrew R. 
Kaufman, Bruce B. Way & Enrico Suardi, Forty Years After Jackson v. Indiana: States’ Compliance 
with “Reasonable Period of Time” Ruling, 40 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 261, 261 (2012) (most states 
out of compliance with Jackson).  At least one state Supreme Court has specifically sanctioned 
procedures that ignore the Jackson holding. See State v. Werner, 796 P.2d 610, 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1990) (not error to treat dangerous patients committed pursuant to Jackson differently from civil 
patients).For a discussion of all related issues, see Michael L. Perlin, “Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail”: 
Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Remediate the Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17 
MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 343, 347 (2013) (Perlin, Wisdom). 
19  Said the Court in Jackson:  
Indiana cannot constitutionally commit the petitioner for an indefinite period 
simply on account of his incompetency to stand trial on the charges filed 
against him. . . . [B]y subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment 
standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally 
applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus condemning 
him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required 
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there was an independent showing of such dangerousness that he could not safely 
be housed elsewhere.20  Also, the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA)21 has called into question the legality of placing all incompetent patients—no 
matter what their individual level of dangerousness or their charged offense—in 
maximum security facilities, solely by nature of the fact that there is a criminal 
detainer lodged against them.22  
A critical question that remains mostly unanswered for forensic hospitals is 
the extent of a patient’s perceived dangerousness that is required for such secure 
hospital commitment as opposed to what is acceptable prior to transfer to a non-
secure facility.23 The question of dangerousness required has been and remains an 
important one in the minds of patients, those treating them, and the public at large. 
While some judges and legislators in the United States have begun to directly 
address the issue, a fair amount of ambiguity remains.24  This ambiguity—along 
with the lack of agreement and clarification by the courts—may ultimately lead to a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
for commitment or the opportunity for release . . . Indiana deprived petitioner 
of equal protection.  
406 U.S. at 720, 730. 
20  Id. at 728, 733, 738. 
21  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2006). 
22  Perlin, supra note 18, at 201–07. In a study of all cases heard by New Zealand’s Mental Health Review 
Tribunal over an eighteen year period, it was found that the Tribunal recommended change in legal 
status in only two percent of all forensic cases. See KATEY THOM ET AL., BALANCING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
WITH PUBLIC POLICY: THE DECISION-MAKING OF THE MENTAL HEALTH REVIEW TRIBUNAL 23 (2014). In 
Australia, only a “small number” of forensic patients is even provided representation. See ELEANORE 
FRITZE, SHINING A LIGHT BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: REPORT OF THE JACK BROCKHOFF FOUNDATION 
CHURCHILL FELLOWSHIP TO BETTER PROTECT THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES, DETAINED IN CLOSED ENVIRONMENTS FOR COMPULSORY TREATMENT, THROUGH THE USE OF 
LEGAL SERVICES 36 n.233 (2015). 
23  For discussions of New York’s policy on transfer to non-secure facilities based on CPL § 33.20, see Ernst 
J. v. Stone, 452 F.3d 186, 188 (2d Cir. 2006); Richard S. v. Carpinello, 628 F. Supp. 2d 286 (N.D.N.Y. 
2008); In re David B., 766 N.E.2d 565 (N.Y. 2002). For application of the New York “3 track” system of 
categorizing mental disorders and the appropriateness of secure confinement, see In re Amir F., 94 
A.D.3d 1209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012), In re Eric U., 40 A.D.3d 1148 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); In re Torres, 
166 A.D.2d 228, 228–29 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (Commissioner of Mental Health failed to meet burden of 
showing level of dangerousness required to confine defendant in secure facility); People v. Salem, 122 
A.D.2d 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). The different “tracks” in the N.Y. system are explained infra text 
accompanying notes 45–50. Ironically, many “non-secure” facilities are becoming increasingly locked 
down, and it is becoming more difficult to tell the differences between the levels of dangerousness 
required by these facilities, which should in theory be readily distinguishable.   
24   Transfers are, of course, often based on (usually informal) risk assessments. See infra text 
accompanying notes 89–91 on the inherent ambiguity often present in such assessment decision-
making. At least one court has ruled that, as the question before it was “only with requests for transfer 
from one mental hospital to another, and not with requests for release, the concern for psychiatric 
predictions of dangerousness [is] not relevant here.” In re Hospitalization of Patterson, 372 A.2d 1173, 
1175 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977), rev’d on other grounds, 383 A.2d 467 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1978), cert. denied, 391 A.2d 484 (N.J. 1978). 
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violation of a person’s right to be confined in the least restrictive alternative, a right 
that applies in all settings to all patients confined in hospitals. 25  
This potential for the violation of patients’ rights is especially troubling 
because of recent developments in international human rights law, especially the 
ratification of the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD).26 As we will discuss below, the CRPD is the most revolutionary 
international human rights document ever created that applies to persons with 
disabilities.27 It furthers the human rights approach to disability—endorsing a 
social model and repudiating a purely medical model—and recognizes the right of 
people with disabilities to equality in most every aspect of life.28 Although little 
attention has been paid to its potential impact on forensic patients,29 we believe it is 
essential that there be a new focus notwithstanding the fact that virtually no 
consideration of the Convention’s application to this population yet appears in the 
literature.30 
            This Article will address these issues individually and together as they 
appear in the United States and under international law principles.31 We will 
consider “risk” in two ways: first, the need for clinicians to be able to assess a 
patient’s risk in both secure and non-secure facilities and second, the legal risk to 
clinicians if their assessment is wrong. We will also address “security” because an 
emphasis on safety is at the forefront of the minds of the public as well as judges 
involved in cases where dangerousness is considered.32 We will also discuss 
                                                          
25  See infra text accompanying notes 65–70, discussing, inter alia, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 
(2003); Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); see also Perlin, 
supra note 18, at 217–18 (discussing these cases in a parallel context). 
26  G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106, at 2 (Jan. 24, 2007); see generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD 143–59 
(2012). 
27  See generally Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human Rights: Evolution and 
Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: VISION, PRAXIS, AND COURAGE 98 
(Michael Dudley et al. eds., 2012); PERLIN, supra note 26, at 3–21; Michael L. Perlin, “A Change Is 
Gonna Come”: The Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483, 
484 (2009). 
28  See, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting Through the Lens of Mental Disability: The 
Proposed International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons 
with Disabilities, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 181, 191–92 (2005). 
29  But see Perlin & Schriver, supra note 5, at 16. One of the co-authors (MLP) discusses this further in 
Michael L. Perlin, “God Said to Abraham/Kill Me a Son”: Why the Insanity Defense and the 
Incompetency Status Are Compatible with and Required by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and Basic Principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 477 (2017). 
30  Dhir, supra note 28, at 201–02.  
31  In this paper, we focus on New York state, but the issues affect forensic facilities in all the states. 
32  “Judges are embedded in the cultural presuppositions that engulf us all.” PERLIN, supra note 2, at 47. 
On the bias often shown by judges towards litigants with mental disabilities, see, e.g., JOHN PARRY & 
ERIC Y. DROGIN, CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AND 
TESTIMONY 5 (2000); Perlin, supra note 13, at 377. This bias is sanism: “an irrational prejudice of the 
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“danger” as it is the basis for many statutes governing confinement of the mentally 
ill, and “dangerousness” itself is a particularly indefinable term in this context. 
Finally, we will discuss the issue of “human rights” because of the importance of the 
CRPD as well as the importance of ensuring fair treatment in all nations.  
We are then faced with the “clinician’s dilemma,” which occurs each time a 
treatment provider attempts to combine these previously-described topics into a 
formula to apply to his patients. This dilemma is made more obvious by the 
discordance in case law and statutes, as well as organized psychiatry’s reliance on 
dangerousness predictions that continue to be unreliable at best, and prejudicial at 
worst. We will also consider all of the issues in question through the prism of TJ in 
an effort to determine whether current policies are, in fact, therapeutic or anti-
therapeutic and whether or not they reflect the “ethic of care” mandated by TJ.33 
The first portion of the title of this paper comes from Every Grain of Sand,34 
one of Bob Dylan’s very saddest and most beautifully-imaged songs;35 one, according 
to the critic Paul Williams that “reaches beyond its context to communicate a deeply 
felt devotional spirit based on universal experiences: pain of self-awareness, and 
sense of wonder or awe,” and is about “the moment(s) [that] we accept our pain and 
vulnerability.”36 We believe, as we will discuss subsequently in the Article, that the 
lyric in question truly defines the conundrum we face. 
I. FORENSIC AND SECURE FACILITIES 
 
A. Introduction 
To confront the questions that we raise in this paper, it is necessary to first 
consider the extent of dangerousness that is required for secure hospital 
commitment versus transfer to a non-secure facility—a question that was first 
raised to one of the authors (MLP) over eleven years ago by the then-head of the 
Kirby Forensic Center in New York City, one of New York state’s two maximum 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in prevailing 
social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia and ethnic bigotry.” See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, 
“Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind”: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Mental Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1159, 1180 (2013). 
33  See infra text accompanying notes 175–207. 
34  Bob Dylan, Every Grain of Sand, BOB DYLAN, http://www.bobdylan.com/us/songs/every-grain-sand (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
35  The lyric comes from the first verse:  
 In the time of my confession, in the hour of my deepest need  
When the pool of tears beneath my feet flood every newborn seed  
There’s a dyin’ voice within me reaching out somewhere  
Toiling in the danger and in the morals of despair. 
36  PAUL WILLIAMS, BOB DYLAN: PERFORMING ARTIST, 1974–1986, THE MIDDLE YEARS 1974–1986, at 205 
(1992). For a lengthy analysis of Every Grain, see generally MICHAEL GRAY, SONG AND DANCE MAN III: 
THE ART OF BOB DYLAN 400–25 (2000). 
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security forensic hospitals. 37 This issue becomes especially important as “non-
secure” facilities have become increasingly locked down to the extent that there is 
now, in many important ways, little difference between facilities. This lack of 
discernible differences between various types of facilities looms even larger in light 
of statutes and judicial decisions mandating that patients be placed in the least 
restrictive alternative settings appropriate for their treatment.38 
B. New York State Law 
We will focus here on New York developments. Under the relevant statute, 
New York Criminal Procedure Law section 330.20(1)(c), the term “dangerous 
mental disorder” means: (i) that a defendant currently suffers from a “mental 
illness” and (ii) that “because of such condition he currently constitutes a physical 
danger to himself or others.”39 If we examine the New York Court of Appeals’ 
decisions from the past two decades, certain controlling principles emerge. 
 It is constitutionally permissible for the state to engage in a presumption 
that a defendant’s “causative mental illness” has continued beyond the date of the 
original conduct (that would have been criminal but for the defendant’s lack of 
criminal responsibility),40 and a finding of current danger may be made: 
by presenting proof of a history of prior relapses into violent behavior, substance 
abuse or dangerous activities upon release or termination of psychiatric treatment, or 
upon evidence establishing that continued medication is necessary to control 
defendant’s violent tendencies and that defendant is likely not to comply with 
prescribed medication because of a prior history of such noncompliance or because of 
threats of future noncompliance.41 
 Extended supervision is justified, in significant part, because of the “inability 
of modern psychiatry to guarantee the safety of the public through effective 
                                                          
37  Email from Jim Hicks, M.D., Assoc. Clinical Dir., Kirby Forensic Center, to Michael L. Perlin, Dir., 
International Mental Disability Law Reform Project & Online Mental Disability Law Program, New 
York Law School (Apr. 3, 2006) (on file with authors). 
38  See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 330 (McKinney Supp. 2017); In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 
N.Y.S.2d 848, 853–54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). 
39  See also, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 330.20(1)(d) (McKinney Supp. 2017) (stating that “[m]entally ill” means 
that a defendant currently suffers from a mental illness for which care and treatment as a patient, in 
the in-patient services of a psychiatric center under the jurisdiction of the state office of mental health, 
is essential to such defendant's welfare and that his judgment is so impaired that he is unable to 
understand the need for such care and treatment). 
40  In re George L., 648 N.E.2d 475, 480 (1995) (quoting In re Torsney, 394 N.E.2d 262, 265 (1979)). In re 
George L. was most recently cited in this context in New York in Makas v. Mid-Hudson Forensic 
Psychiatric Center, 905 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. 2010); In re Justice v. Evans, 23 N.Y.S.3d 749, 750 (App. 
Div. 2016) (citing George L. when holding that a recommitment order must be premised on proof that 
may include “a history of prior relapses into violent behavior, [or] substance abuse or dangerous 
activities upon release or termination of psychiatric treatment”); State v. Matter, 958 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558  
(App. Div. 2013) (“Contrary to respondent’s contention, proof of his past conduct is probative of his 
present mental state.”). 
41  George L., 648 N.E.2d at 81. 
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treatment permanently removing the potentiality of recurrent violent acts by 
persons found not responsible by reason of mental illness, thereby justifying 
extended continuous supervision over the acquittee by the criminal court through 
an order of conditions.”42  
[Some] constitutionally required minimum level of dangerousness to oneself or others 
that must be shown before an insanity acquittee may be retained in a non-secure 
facility, [but] a finding that an individual is ‘mentally ill’ . . . under CPL § 
330.20(1)(d)43 contemplates a degree of dangerousness that satisfies due process 
concerns.44 
 The statute contemplates a three-tier track system.45 Those suffering from a 
“dangerous mental disorder” (Track 1)46 are subject to “continued, direct 
oversight.”47 Those “mentally ill” (for these purposes, persons whose illnesses 
require inpatient care and treatment that is essential to the defendant’s welfare, 
and who, because of impaired judgment, do not understand the need for such care 
and treatment) (Track 2) are governed by the civil commitment laws.48 Those who 
are neither mentally ill nor dangerous under these definitions (Track 3) are entitled 
to immediate release with or without conditions.49 Other factors to consider in 
determining whether a Track 2 acquittee needs continued retention in a non-secure 
facility include: 
 the need to prepare for a safe and stable transition from non-secure 
commitment to release, 
 evidence  of recent acts of violence and the risk of harm to the defendant 
or others, 
 the nature of the conduct that resulted in the initial commitment, 
 the  likelihood of relapse or a cure, 
 history of substance or alcohol abuse, 
                                                          
42  In re Francis S., 663 N.E.2d 881, 885 (N.Y. 1995). 
43  See supra note 39 discussion. 
44  In re David B., 766 N.E.2d at 570 (N.Y. 2002). Most recently,  in Makas, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 480.,, on the 
facts of the case before it, the trial court concluded that in the case of an individual who suffered from a 
mental illness but not a “dangerous” mental illness, it did not have authority to change his commitment 
from a secure to a non-secure facility.  
45  On the differential in appeal processes in Track 1 and Track 2 cases, see In re Jamie R., 844 N.E.2d 
285, 291 (N.Y. 2006) (stating that the track status of track 2 patient can only be changed on appeal, not 
by review hearing); In re Norman D., 818 N.E.2d 642, 643 (N.Y. 2004) (noting that the track status of a 
track 1 patient can only be changed on appeal, not by review hearing). For more recent discussions of 
New York’s track system in this context, see In re Robert T. v. Sproat, 955 N.Y.S.2d 134, 138 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2012); People v. Sharon T., No. 1735/09, 2011 WL 1900047, at *1–2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 18, 2011).  
46  See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 330.20(6) (McKinney Supp. 2017). 
47  In re David B., 766 N.E.2d at 571 n.4. See also e.g., Allen B. v. Sproat, 991 N.Y.S.2d 386 (2014) (a 
supervising court in a track-1 case may include in an order of conditions for release an effective-
evaluation provision). 
48  David B., 755 N.E.2d at 571. 
49  Id. 
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 the effects of medication, 
 the  likelihood that the patient will discontinue medication without 
supervision, 
 the  length of confinement and treatment, 
 the  lapse of time since the underlying criminal acts, and 
 “any other relevant factors that form a part of an insanity acquittee’s 
psychological profile.”50 
 
C. Constitutional Dimensions 
 With this statutory predicate, we must also consider the constitutional 
imperative that we apply the concept of the least restrictive alternative to all 
institutional mental disability law decision making. There is no question that the 
constitutional mandate of providing the least restrictive alternative (LRA)—first 
famously spelled out in a mental disability law context well over forty years ago in 
the case of Lessard v. Schmidt51—applies to all aspects of institutional decision 
making, whether they involve civil patients or forensic patients. This broad 
application has been made clear by the US Supreme Court, other relevant federal 
courts, and the New York state courts. 
 In Lessard, the federal district court ruled that “even if the standards for an 
adjudication of mental illness and potential dangerousness are satisfied, a court 
should order full-time involuntary hospitalization only as a last resort.”52 Quoting 
Shelton v. Tucker,53 the court characterized “the most basic and fundamental right 
[as] the right to be free from unwanted restraint,”54 concluding that “persons 
suffering from the condition of being mentally ill but who are not alleged to have 
committed any crime, cannot be totally deprived of their liberty if there are less 
drastic means for achieving the same basic goal.”55 The court placed the burden for 
exploring alternatives to institutionalization on “the person recommending full-time 
involuntary hospitalization,”56 who must prove the following:  
(1) what alternatives are available; (2) what alternatives were investigated; and (3) 
why the investigated alternatives were not deemed suitable. These alternatives 
include voluntary or court-ordered out-patient treatment, day treatment in a 
hospital, night treatment in a hospital, placement in the custody of a friend or 
                                                          
50  Id. at 572. 
51  349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); see also Michael 
L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. 
L. REV. 63, 86 n.138 (1991). 
52  Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1095. 
53  364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). Shelton involved the associational rights of public schoolteachers; see id.  
54  Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1095–96.  
55  Id. at 1096.  
56  Id. 
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relative, placement in a nursing home, referral to a community mental health clinic, 
and home health aide services.57 
 
 These principles have been articulated in multiple New York state cases, 
dating back to the 1973 decision of Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous:58 “To subject a 
person to a greater deprivation of personal liberty than necessary to achieve the 
purpose for which he is being confined is, it is clear, violative of due process.”59 
Subsequent New York cases have been in accord. By way of example, Ughetto v. 
Acrish states the principle this way: “The burden of proof at such a hearing is upon 
the hospital to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the patient poses a 
substantial threat to himself or others and that involuntary commitment is the 
least restrictive means available for treatment.”60 
 Courts in other jurisdictions have specifically ruled that the LRA principles 
apply to the transfer of patients from a less secure hospital to a more secure 
hospital.61 Although this issue has never been dealt with squarely by a New York 
court, the Mental Hygiene Legal Services ex rel. Aliza K. v. Ford 62 decision (which 
did not require a full due process hearing prior to the transfer of a patient to a more 
secure facility) indicated that, where the “stigma of being a patient at [the more 
secure facility] may be greater than that of being hospitalized at [the less secure 
facility, such a] transfer implicates a liberty interest which triggers rights to 
procedural due process,”63 citing Kesselbrenner and the US Supreme Court’s prison-
hospital transfer case of Vitek v. Jones.64  
 The LRA principle has been articulated in two very different ways in three 
US Supreme Court cases. In 1990, in Riggins v. Nevada,65 reversing a conviction in 
a case where a competent defendant pleading the insanity defense was medicated at 
trial against his will, the Court ruled that such medication would only be allowed if 
the state proved either of the following: that (1) the treatment was “medically 
appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of 
Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others,” or (2) there were no less intrusive 
means by which to obtain an adjudication of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.66 
                                                          
57  Id. 
58  305 N.Y.2d 903, 906 (N.Y. 1973). 
59  Id. at 905.  
60  494 N.Y.S.2d 943, 944 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (citing in re Harry M., 468 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1983)) (reading LRA requirement into Mental Hygiene Law, and holding that only least restrictive 
alternative consistent with legitimate purposes of such commitment can be imposed).  
61  See, e.g., Scott v. Plante, 691 F.2d 634 (3d Cir. 1982); Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (E.D. 
Pa. 1977); see generally, PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 4-4.1.1, at 4-224 to 4-228.  
62  705 N.E.2d 1191, 1194–96 (N.Y. 1998). 
63  Id. at 194. 
64  445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980). 
65  504 U.S. 127, 132–35 (1992).  
66  Id. at 135. Subsequently, in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166,178–81 (2003), the Supreme Court 
expanded on this ruling in a case involving a defendant whom the government was seeking to medicate 
so as to make him competent to stand trial. In ruling that medication must necessarily further 
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Then, seven years later, in Olmstead v. L.C.,67 the Court construed the ADA to 
mandate that a state may place persons with mental disabilities in a less restrictive 
setting if the state provides both substantive safeguards in the form of opinions 
from treatment professionals and procedural safeguards in the form of a waiting list 
to move people into community settings.68 Both before and after its decision in 
Olmstead, the Supreme Court has ruled that the ADA applies to prison settings;69 it 
is inconceivable that a court would rule that it does not apply to a forensic mental 
health facility.70  
 In short, there is no question that the LRA applies to all cases of persons 
institutionalized because of mental disabilities, including forensic patients.71 One of 
the authors (MLP) has previously argued that this is specifically demanded by the 
ADA, and we believe that the arguments made there apply specifically to the cases 
we are discussing in this paper.72 
II. ON RISK 
As discussed above, the word “risk” carries with it multiple meanings in the 
context of making determinations about dangerousness, and those determinations 
affect a patient’s level of confinement.73 First, there is the risk posed by the patient 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“significant” state interests, the Court underscored that this could only be done if “any alternative, less 
intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results.” Id. at 181. 
67  527 U.S. 581, 602 (1999).  
68  Id. at 602, 605–06. One of the authors (MLP) discusses both Riggins and Olmstead in this context in 
Perlin, supra note 18, at 217–18 (written prior to the Sell decision).  
69  See, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006); Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. 
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998).   
70  See, e.g., Bates v. Dep’t of Behavioral & Dev. Serv., 863 A.2d 890, 906–07 (Me. 2004).  
71  Some cases from other jurisdictions agree. See, e.g., Schuttemeyer v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 124, 
128 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990), reh'g denied (Ky. Ct. App. 1990), discretionary review denied (Ky. 1990) 
(holding that evidence would not permit finding that hospitalization was least restrictive alternative 
mode of treatment for defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, so as to support involuntary 
hospitalization; testifying psychologist unequivocally stated that involuntary hospitalization was not 
necessary); State v. Kinman, 671 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (arguing that the state bears 
the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence which commitment alternative is least restrictive 
at initial determination of whether insanity acquittee should be involuntarily committed). Those that 
disagree—see, e.g., People v. Cross, 704 N.E.2d 766, 771 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (reasoning that the 
requirement under corrections law that insanity acquittee be held in secure setting governed over 
requirement under Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code that person involuntarily 
committed be held in the least restrictive environment possible); State v. Randall, 532 N.W.2d 94, 108 
(Wis. 1995) (noting that insanity acquittees, unlike other involuntarily committed persons, do not have 
right, under prior version of patients' rights statute, to confinement in least restrictive conditions 
necessary to achieve purposes of their commitment)—all predate Olmstead and thus should be seen as 
being of questionable precedential value.  
72  See Perlin, supra note 18, at 194–95 (“I believe that, after Olmstead, policies that mandate that all 
defendants awaiting incompetence and insanity evaluations, all defendants found permanently 
incompetent . . . and all NGRI acquittees must be evaluated, treated, or confined only in a state's 
maximum security facility for the criminally insane violate the ADA.”). 
73  On how assessments of risk and dangerousness are the most important factors in decision making by 
tribunals tasked with decisions as to release of persons in psychiatric institutions, see THOM ET AL., 
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himself. That risk may be to others or to himself, and clinicians must be adequately 
prepared to predict it accurately, using meaningful assessment tools. Risk and 
dangerousness are quite interconnected; the risk of danger posed by a patient is 
what determines that patient’s ultimate placement. The risk of future 
dangerousness is what keeps clinicians using these risk assessment tools and what 
pushes non-secure facilities to become more and more secure.74 
However, there is also risk in the context of clinician error. The risk of an 
inaccurate prediction of dangerousness can have serious consequences for the 
clinician who made the prediction, as well as anyone harmed by the inaccurately 
assessed, dangerous individual.75 Further, societal beliefs about the inherent 
danger posed by all mentally ill individuals put pressure on clinicians to make 
accurate assessments,76 but with that comes pressure to keep individuals with 
mental illness confined, even when dangerousness may not actually be at issue, or 
the finding of dangerousness may be tenuous at best.77 Even the Supreme Court has 
recognized the “fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis” and the issues that then arise 
when individuals are deprived of their basic freedoms based on this fallibility.78 
Dangerousness itself, as a concept, is also a difficult one,79 given that it can mean 
many things in many different contexts, and the fear of dangerousness can have 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
supra note 22, at 14 (citing, inter alia, JILL PEAY, TRIBUNALS ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING 
UNDER THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT 1983 (1989)). 
74  But, on the shortcomings of these instruments, see, e.g., Eric Janus & Robert Prentky, Forensic Use of 
Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1443,  1472 (2003) (“[T]o a greater or lesser extent, all ARA [actuarial risk assessment] 
instruments have shortcomings, and these shortcomings detract from the reliability of the 
instruments.”); see generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, SHAMING THE CONSTITUTION: 
THE DETRIMENTAL RESULTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR LEGISLATION  (2017). 
75  On such litigation, see generally, PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 12-3.14, at 12-198–12-202. 
76  On the “extra-legal pressures on experts to find dangerousness,” see Nora V. Demleitner, Abusing State 
Power or Controlling Risk?: Sex Offender Commitment and Sicherungsverwahrung, 30 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1621, 1658-59 (2003), (quoting in part Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled 
Constitutional Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 202–03(1996) (“[Among 
such pressures are] a fear of liability or censure from a false prediction of safety; the absence of any 
external consequences from a false prediction of violence . . . ; and the tendency of clinicians to see those 
factors which confirm the existing diagnosis and predictions, and ignore those which disconfirm it.”). 
77  See, e.g., Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Violence Risk Assessment at Federal Capital 
Sentencing, 29 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 512, 532–33 (2002) (noting that individuals undertaking violence 
risk assessment are likely to commit a number of fundamental errors unless guided by reliable 
scientific methodology and group data, often resulting in an overestimation of violence risk). On the 
specific issues raised in this context in death penalty cases, see Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. 
Reidy, Don't Confuse Me with the Facts: Common Errors in Violence Risk Assessment at Capital 
Sentencing, 26 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 20, 22 (1999).  
78  Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979). 
79  See Alexander Tsesis, Due Process in Civil Commitment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253, 286 (2011) (“If 
mental illness is difficult to prove, the dangerousness element is even more difficult because it involves 
a prediction of future behavior.”). 
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consequences for those labeled as “dangerous.”80 When society believes that a 
certain group of people are inherently dangerous and pose greater risks than do 
other groups, that belief can result in the continued violation of those individuals’ 
rights.81  As a result of these dilemmas, there is extra pressure on clinicians and 
state officials to always err on the side of retaining patients in more secure 
conditions, such decisions being unlikely to result in tart criticism.82 If the patients 
involved are forensic patients (thus explicitly having had some contact with the 
criminal justice system), these decisions become even easier to justify. 
A. The Elasticity of the Word “Dangerousness” and its Multiple Meanings. 
 Twenty-two years ago, in writing about the application of the then-new field 
of “therapeutic jurisprudence”83 to involuntary civil commitment law, one of the 
authors (MLP) and two colleagues said this about the “revolution” in commitment 
law in the 1970s: 
Not incidentally, the initiation of more formal hearings forced medical personnel to 
alter the manner in which they testified. For the first time, psychiatrists were 
subjected to rigorous cross-examination and were required to substantiate their 
medical opinions rather than merely make medical conclusions. At the same time, 
psychiatric diagnostic and predictive skills were more closely scrutinized. Lawyers 
were often successful in convincing courts that psychiatric diagnoses and predictions 
of dangerousness were inaccurate.   The meaning of dangerousness also became an 
important area of litigation. Critics charged that the concept was “vague” and 
“amorphous,” and its “elasticity” has made it “one of the most problematic and 
elusive concepts in mental health law.”84 
 
 Nothing has changed since the publication of that article over two decades 
ago. There are few words in the legal literature as elastic as “dangerousness,”85 an 
elasticity that is even more singular in light of the fact that it is a word no longer in 
good currency with researchers and clinicians, who have reconceptualized the 
                                                          
80  On how persons with mental illness are marginalized because of this fear of dangerousness, see 
Lawrence O. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, Towards a Framework Convention on Global Health: A 
Transformative Agenda for Global Health Justice, 13 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 14 (2013). 
81  On the “inherent fallibility of ‘preventive’ determinations that are based on assessments of future 
dangerousness” in the area of detention of suspected terrorists, see Catherine Powell, Scholars’ 
Statement of Principles for the New President on U.S. Detention Policy: An Agenda for Change, 47 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 339, 340–41 (2009). 
82  See Robert Sade, Introduction: Symposium on Evolution, Prevention, and Responses to Aggressive 
Behavior and Violence, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 8, 13 (2004). 
83  See infra text accompanying notes 175–207. 
84  Michael L. Perlin, Keri K. Gould & Deborah A. Dorfman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 80, 86–87 (1995). 
85  See, e.g., GREGG BARAK, CRIMINOLOGY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 132 (2009). 
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relevant inquiry as one that considers the degree of risk86 via validated risk 
assessment instruments. 87 According to Professor Christopher Slobogin, one of the 
leading legal scholars in this area, “[t]oday, social scientists talk about risk 
assessment, not predicting dangerousness, to connote the idea that the potential for 
violence is not something that resides solely in the individual, but rather stems 
from the interaction of biological, psychological, and social variables.”88 But, even 
using the word dangerousness (the criteria specified in New York in § 330),89 we are 
confronted by the fact that for thirty years, thoughtful judges, writing nuanced 
opinions, have acknowledged that there are multiple dimensions to the word.  
As long ago as 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court, writing in State v. Krol, 
pointed out that “[d]angerousness is a concept which involves substantial elements 
of vagueness and ambiguity,”90 and the court acknowledged the “difficulty of 
making valid and meaningful predictions of the likelihood of future harmful 
conduct”91 made more difficult by the “subtle but strong pressures upon decision 
makers to overpredict dangerousness.”92 In the same opinion, the court noted that 
“[a] defendant may be dangerous in only certain types of situations or in connection 
with relationships with certain individuals” and that any “evaluation of 
dangerousness in such cases must take into account the likelihood that defendant 
will be exposed to such situations or come into contact with such individuals.”93 
 Interestingly, Krol, an insanity acquittee case, was one of the first important 
state court cases to demand individualized risk assessments (without using that 
                                                          
86  See, e.g., Aletha Claussen-Schulz, Marc Pearce & Robert Schopp, Dangerousness, Risk Assessment, and 
Capital Sentencing, 10 PSYCHOL.  PUB. POL’Y  & L. 471 (2004). On the relationship between criminal 
history and risk assessments, see Melissa Hamilton, Back to the Future: The Influence of Criminal 
History on Risk Assessments, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75 (2015). Legal scholars have begun to consider 
seriously and carefully all aspects of risk assessment decision making in a variety of contexts far 
removed from the topic of this paper. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (2004); Jonathan Simon, Risk and Reflexivity: What Socio-Legal Studies Ads to the Study 
of Risk and the Law, 57 ALA. L. REV. 119, 122 (2005). On the related question of the relationship 
between risk and heuristic reasoning, see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic 
for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973). One of the authors (MLP) 
discusses the power of heuristics in related contexts in, inter alia, Michael L. Perlin, “The Executioner's 
Face Is Always Well-Hidden”: The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 201, 231 (1996) (“We know how, as a result of the vividness heuristic, one salient case can 
lead to the restructuring of an entire body of jurisprudence.”), and Michael L. Perlin & Naomi 
Weinstein, “Said I, ‘But You Have No Choice’”: Why a Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client’s Decision 
about Mental Health Treatment Even if It Is Not What S/he Would Have Chosen, 15 CARDOZO  PUBLIC 
L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. __ (2017) (forthcoming), manuscript at 24 (“One single vivid, memorable case 
overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational choices should be made.”). 
87  See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275, 277 (2006). 
On risk assessment in the context of civil commitment, see Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The 
“Fit” of Expert Predictions in Civil Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 13 (2003).  
88  Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 127–28 (2005). 
89  See supra note 39, for the key provisions of this statute. 
90  State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 301 (N.J. 1975).  
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. at 302; see also PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 3-5.1.2(b), at 3-102 to 3-109. 
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phrase): “[The state’s] contention that, as a class, persons acquitted by reason of 
insanity are more likely to be dangerous than other persons does not rationally 
establish that any particular individual in the class should be confined even if he is 
not dangerous.”94 And, “the disposition must be individualized with the focus on the 
offender, not the offense he committed, although such offense can serve as an 
indication of the harm the patient is capable of inflicting.”95 
 While Krol has no precedential value in New York (which has, in cases such 
as Jamie R. v. Consilvio96 and In re Stone,97 embraced—incorrectly in our view—the 
US Supreme Court’s standard articulated in Jones v. Unites States,98 employing a 
limited due process model in such cases),99 this language should still inform 
decisionmakers in the individual cases at hand. 
B. The Most Recent Research on the Ability of Mental Health Professionals to 
Predict Dangerousness to Any Level of Medical Certainty 
 The next question to confront is that of the accuracy of psychiatric 
predictions,100 and here it is necessary to begin with the work of Professor John 
Monahan.101 Monahan’s research is crystal clear and uncontroverted: unstructured 
clinical assessments of dangerousness are neither valid nor reliable,102 and, at best, 
they allow clinicians to distinguish violent from non-violent patients “with a 
modest, better-than-chance level of accuracy.”103 By contrast, there are structured 
risk assessment tools—employing different means of statistical or actuarial risk 
assessment—now available that, by any measure of reckoning,104 are superior to the 
unstructured assessments traditionally used.105However, as Monahan notes: 
                                                          
94  Krol, 344 A.2d at 299.  
95  Id. at 303.  
96  844 N.E.2d 285, 286 n.2 (N.Y. 2006).  
97  740 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (App. Div. 2002). 
98          463 U.S. 354 (1983) (rejecting arguments that it was unconstitutional to retain insanity acquittees for 
longer periods of time than the maximum sentence for the underlying crime). 
99  One of the authors (MLP) critiques this approach as anti-therapeutic in Michael L. Perlin, A Law of 
Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 430 n.157(2000). 
100  See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE 
STATES 19–28 (2013); PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 3.4.2.5, at 3-50 to 3-84. 
101  Professor Monahan’s status as the “leading thinker on this issue” has been constant for over three 
decades. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).   
102  See John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm among Prisoners, 
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 394 (2006) (Monahan, Forecasting); John Monahan, 
Tarasoff at Thirty: How Developments in Science and Policy Shape the Common Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 
497, 498–99 (2006) (Monahan, hereinafter Developments).  
103  Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About Accuracy, 62 J. CONSULTING 
& CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 783, 790 (1994) (discussing Prof. Monahan’s work). 
104  William Grove & Paul Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and 
Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293, 318 (1996) (“We know of no social science controversy for which the 
empirical studies are so numerous, varied, and consistent as this one."). 
105  Monahan, Forecasting, supra note 102, at 406–07; Monahan, Developments, supra note 102, at 511–13. 
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The . . . scientific literature is clear that structured risk assessment is superior to 
unstructured risk assessment in accurately predicting violent behavior. But are 
mental health professionals heeding the research and using structured risk 
assessments when assessing violence risk? The literature on the incorporation of 
structured risk assessment into the clinical practice of predicting violence is thin, but 
all of it suggests that only a minority of mental health professionals routinely employ 
structured risk assessment.106 
Importantly, the inability of psychiatric professionals to predict violence has been 
specifically recognized by the US Supreme Court.107 However, most lower courts 
have not embraced this finding, and continue to place tremendous amounts of 
weight on risk assessment measures that are often outdated and scientifically 
unreliable.108 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
See also, e.g., Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 409, 409 (2001). 
106  Monahan, Developments, supra note 102, at 511, 513. 
107  See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323–24 (1993) (stating that there are “difficulties inherent in 
diagnosis of mental illness. It is thus no surprise that many psychiatric predictions of future violent 
behavior by the mentally ill are inaccurate.” (internal citation omitted)). 
108  For an analysis of common risk assessment tools, actuarial tools and standards of professional 
judgment, see Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, The Accuracy of Recidivism Risk Assessments 
for Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of 118 Prediction Studies, 21 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 1 (2009); see 
generally, JAY SINGH ET AL, THE INTERNATIONAL RISK SURVEY: USE AND PERCEIVED UTILITY OF 
STRUCTURED VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS IN 44 COUNTRIES (2016).  
Hanson and Morton-Bourgon discuss the use of risk assessment tools as they relate to 
predictions of dangerousness, and how these predictions have become standard practice in many areas 
of law. In particular, those working with sex offenders are particularly conscious of risk assessment 
tools. Measures such as the STATIC-99 and STATIC-2002 have become, in many jurisdictions,  the sole 
measure of dangerousness prediction in many cases of civil commitment of a sex offender when 
determining his future dangerousness. While some risk assessment measures may have limited success 
in predicting actual recurrence of offenses, it is frequently the case that these tools will over-predict the 
likelihood of re-offense. Risk assessments measure “static” and “dynamic” factors based on the 
individual, but often do not have reliable predictability. Recent meta-analyses of the most popular risk 
assessment measures have showed that, even with the addition of multiple factors supposedly linked to 
recidivism, the predictive capabilities of these risk assessment measures has not dramatically 
increased beyond its standard percentage of accuracy. 
However, it is important to note that this meta-analysis also showed less predictive capability 
in the unstructured professional judgment risk assessment determination than any of the actuarial 
tools. While risk assessment for dangerousness in general for violent crimes and specifically for sex 
offender recidivism is still not an entirely reliable or even, in the case of some less-tested instruments, 
a valid measurement, it still prevails over the use of the “professional judgment” standard in any study 
of effectiveness. On these questions in general, see Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, “Far 
From the Turbulent Space”: Considering the Adequacy of Counsel in the Representation of Individuals 
Accused of Being Sexually Violent Predators, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE  125 (2015) (discussing these 
instruments and the special abilities needed by counsel to understand them and to effectively cross-
examine witnesses who rely on them); see generally, PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 74. 
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 In short, if forensic clinicians are not using the sort of structural tools 
discussed by Professor Monahan,109 then, simply, their predictions—though, in 
hindsight, sometimes accurate—are not grounded on a valid and reliable scientific 
basis.110 What is especially interesting here is that in at least two of its cases in this 
area of the law, the New York Court of Appeals has identified imprecision of 
psychiatric predictivity of dangerousness as a basis for its finding that “psychiatry 
cannot now guarantee the safety of the public from future dangerous acts of persons 
found not responsible . . . and will most likely be unable to do so in the foreseeable 
future”111 and as a rationale for relying on legislative categorizations in this area of 
the law.”112 
This decision is a mixed blessing for clinicians and attorneys working in the 
field of mental disability law.113 While it is important to recognize the inability of 
risk assessment techniques to deliver precise predictions about dangerousness and 
recidivism, it may be equally improper to allow an, at times, uninformed legislature 
to “categorize” types of defendants based on their symptoms or diagnosis. The New 
York Court of Appeals is correct in its decision to move away from the traditional 
reliance on risk assessment measures, but it may be allowing a practice of 
legislating dangerousness that will result in overbroad and far-reaching 
categorizations of defendants.  
 While New York has a clear set of guidelines it follows in order to classify its 
defendants and their anticipated levels of dangerousness, international mental 
disability law continues to evolve and change based on worldwide developments and 
                                                          
109  Professor Monahan focuses in his recent writings on three: the HCR-20, the VRAG, and the COVR. See, 
e.g., Monahan, Developments, supra note 102, at 504–12. For Professor Monahan’s latest writings in 
this area, see John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, The Evolution of  Violence Risk  Assessment, 19 CNS 
SPECTRUMS  419 (2014) (discussing the need for a continuum of structured approaches to risk 
assessment). On the use of risk assessments in sentencing, see Nicholas Scurich & John Monahan, 
Evidence-based Sentencing: Public Openness and Opposition to Using Gender, Age, and Race as Risk 
Factors for Recidivism,  40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 36 (2016). 
110  Some commentators go even further. See Anton Tolman & Kristine Mullendore, Risk Evaluations for 
the Courts: Is Service Quality a Function of Specialization?, 34 PROF. PSYCHOL. 225, 230 (2003) (“[T]his 
approach to risk evaluation is clearly ignorant of the specialized body of knowledge that has accrued in 
the past 2 decades and is characteristic of the ‘unstructured clinical approach’ to evaluation that has 
been criticized repeatedly (citation omitted) as a method of insufficient reliability and validity for 
making important judgments.”)  
111  In re George L., 648 N.E.2d 475, 481 (N.Y. 1995) (citing 1981 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2261 (McKinney)). See 
also id.at 481 n. 5 (citing Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of 
Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 693 (1990)(“The voluminous literature 
examining the ability of psychiatrists [or other mental health professionals] to predict dangerousness in 
the indeterminate future has been virtually unanimous: ‘psychiatrists have absolutely no expertise in 
predicting dangerous behavior.’”). 
112  See In re Francis S., 663 N.E.2d 881, 885 (N.Y. 1995) (relying on discussion in Jones v. United States, 
463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983), of the “very imprecision of the field of psychiatry.”). 
113  Although counsel is assigned to all persons facing commitment in New York state, see N.Y. MENTAL 
HYG. L. § 47.03, (McKinney 2007), there are many states without the sort of organized counsel system 
present there. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 6-4.4, at 6–54 to 6-58. 
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increased understanding of mental illness and dangerousness.114 As we will discuss 
further, the CRPD was a driving force in re-energizing a worldwide recognition of 
the concepts of mental illness and dangerousness and how they relate to individuals 
in psychiatric facilities.115 
C. The Danger of Erroneous Diagnosis by Clinicians, and the Constitutional 
Problems it Creates 
 Ultimately, the question must be asked: does the Constitution allow for an 
individual to be confined indefinitely and deprived of his liberties based on expert 
testimony in a field that rapidly changes and constantly redefines the parameters of 
dangerousness, risk, and illness itself? Although psychiatry and psychiatric 
diagnosis are accepted practices used to establish the criteria for civil commitment, 
there has never been a challenge in front of the court that argued that the risk of 
clinician error should be weighed against the diagnosis made and its ultimate 
consequences. Notwithstanding this fact, we believe that this is a reasonable 
question to consider. 
 The Supreme Court, in Addington v. Texas,116 made it crystal-clear that the 
reasonable-doubt standard is inappropriate when individuals are being confined 
based on a psychiatric diagnosis.117 The very nature of diagnoses is “based on 
medical ‘impressions’ drawn from subjective analysis and filtered through the 
experience of the diagnostician.”118 Even with safeguards that act to quantify 
diagnostic categories, such as the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual (often characterized as the “gold standard” of 
classification119), the subjectivity of a clinician’s diagnosis may be a constitutional 
problem.  The Addington Court has come closest to authentically confronting the 
potential legal issues inherent in an erroneous psychiatric diagnosis with respect to 
civil commitment.120 The Court there chose to recognize the subjectivity inherent in 
diagnosing complex psychiatric behaviors and used a constitutional analysis to 
implement a more appropriate standard than a simple preponderance quantum.121 
However, no reported case as of yet has challenged an erroneous diagnosis and 
subsequent civil commitment on a constitutional basis. 
                                                          
114  See infra Part III. 
115  See generally, PERLIN, supra note 26. 
116  441 U.S. 416 (1979) (holding that a “clear and convincing” standard of proof is proper for involuntary 
commitment). 
117  Id. at 427–30. 
118  Id. at 430. 
119  E.g., Bruce Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 505, 513 n. 36 (1998); Bruce Familant, The Essential Functions of Being a Lawyer with 
a Non-Visible Disability: On the Wings of a Kiwi Bird, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 517, 526 n.53 (1998). 
120  See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 4-2.3.2, at 4-97 (citing, inter alia, Donald Hermann, Barriers to 
Providing Effective Treatment: A Critique of Revisions in Procedural, Substantive, and Dispositional 
Criteria in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 39 VAND. L.REV. 83, 85 (1986)). 
121  Addington, 441 U.S. at 432–33. 
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 In contrast, the Court in Heller v. Doe wrote about the “[e]ase of diagnosis” 
for individuals with developmental disabilities.122 Those diagnoses are based on 
evidence of disability that is “well-documented throughout childhood” whereas 
clinicians treating patients with mental illness often do not have the luxury of a 
complete history of behaviors.123 In fact, the Court in Heller specifically recognized 
the differences between the two types of diagnosis and stated, “as we recognized in 
an earlier case, diagnosis of mental illness is difficult,” citing to Addington.124 The 
potential for error seems to be recognized; however, there has been no effort made to 
address the effects or consequences of erroneous diagnosis.125 
 This lack of adjustment in the law based on what is now known about the 
potential for erroneous diagnosis may, however, not be solely due to lack of 
recognition and effort. The conflation of risk with psychiatric diagnosis, made ever-
present by ongoing sanism126 and heuristics,127 will lead to an imbalance in the 
weighing of erroneous diagnosis versus unconstitutional confinement. Judges 
concerned with their reputations (and, in some instances, their chances of re-
election)128 will lean more heavily in favor of commitment regardless of the risk of 
clinician error, which is unquantifiable and is virtually never presented as a 
defense.129  
 When clinicians go through the process of making an informed diagnosis, 
they are rarely concerned with “the law”; there is no safety measure built in to the 
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual130 to ensure 
that an erroneous diagnosis does not lead to a future of unconstitutional 
commitment and stigma.131 The law has only recently started to understand the 
fallibility of risk assessment through a constitutional lens. The recognition of the 
                                                          
122  Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 313 (1993). 
123  Id. 
124  Id. at 322. 
125  On the question of Heller’s potential impact on the question of inaccuracy of dangerousness predictions 
in cases involving individuals with mental illness, see  PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 4-2.3.2.2, at 4-
105 to 4-106. 
126  See sources cited supra note 32. 
127  See BARAK, supra note 85, and supra note 86. 
128  On this question in the parallel area of judicial decision-making in sex offender cases, see generally 
Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, “They’re Planting Stories In the Press”: The Impact of Media 
Distortions on Sex Offender Law and Policy, 3 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 185 (2013). 
129   It is not clear why this is. Perhaps counsel for patients believe the argument is not sufficiently strong 
and.or perhaps they are concerned that this might have a deleterious impact on their future 
relationships with the same clinicians. 
130  See generally, Michael L. Perlin, “I Expected It to Happen/I Knew He’d Lost Control”: The Impact of 
PTSD on Criminal Sentencing after the Promulgation of DSM-5, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 881 (2015). 
131  On ways that clinicians have been counseled by leaders in their field to ignore restrictive civil 
commitment laws, see Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 
47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 644-45 (1993), discussing Paul Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary 
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 494, 501 (1976), arguing that “wise and 
benevolent paternalism,” should lead to a “moral judgment” that hospitalization is appropriate for 
patients “incapable of voluntarily accepting help,” in spite of laws rejecting “need of treatment” as a 
commitment standard. 
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danger of erroneous diagnosis is the next logical step for the court to take, following 
on the hints of understanding of the devastating consequences of erroneous 
commitment alluded to in Addington and Heller.  
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PRINCIPLES132 
Given the ratification of the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities133 (CRPD), the state of the law as it relates to persons 
with disabilities must be radically reconsidered.134 The CRPD is “regarded as 
having finally empowered the ‘world’s largest minority’ to claim their rights and to 
participate in international and national affairs on an equal basis with others who 
have achieved specific treaty recognition and protection.”135 This Convention—the 
most revolutionary international human rights document ever created that applies 
to persons with disabilities 136—furthers the human rights approach to disability 
and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in most every aspect 
of life.137  It firmly endorses a social model of disability as it reconceptualizes mental 
health rights as disability rights. The Convention is a clear and direct repudiation 
of the medical model that traditionally was part-and-parcel of mental disability 
law.138  The Convention—“ushering in a new era of disability rights policy”139—
“sketches the full range of human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a 
                                                          
132  This section is generally adapted from Perlin & Schriver, supra note 5. 
133  See generally G.A. Res. 61/106, supra note 26. 
134  See generally PERLIN, supra note 26. 
135  Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 n.17 (2008). See also, e.g., Statements  made 
by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, and the Permanent Representative of 
New Zealand and Chair of the Ad-Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 
Ambassador Don Mackay, at a Special Event on the Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
convened by the UN Human Rights Council (Mar. 26, 2007), http://www.crin.org/en/library/news-
archive/special-event-human-rights-council-new-disability-convention (last visited Apr. 20, 2017) 
(quoting statements made by the High Commissioner For Human Rights, Louise Arbour, and the 
permanent representative of New Zealand and chair of the ad-hoc committee on a Comprehensive and 
Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of 
Persons with Disabilities, Ambassador Don Mackay, at a special event on the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, convened by the UN Human Rights Council). 
136  See, generally Perlin & Szeli, supra note 27; PERLIN, supra note 26, at 3–21; Perlin, supra note 27. 
137  See e.g., Dhir, supra note 28. 
138  See Paul Harpur & Richard Bales, The Positive Impact Of The Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities: A Case Study on the South Pacific and Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 
363, 367 (2010) (CRPD is a “paradigm shift from the medical model to an environmental model to a 
social justice model of disability”). See also Phillip Fennel, Human Rights, Bioethics, and Mental 
Disorder, 27 MED. & L. 95 (2008);  Michael L. Perlin, “Abandoned Love”:  The Impact of Wyatt v. 
Stickney on the Intersection Between International Human Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law, 
35 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 121 (2011). 
139  William P. Schurgin  & Kristen McGurn, The ADA Amendments Act: Expanded Disability Challenges 
for Health Care Employers,  Issue No. 20, HEALTHCARE COMPL. REP. 10484213 (C.C.H.), 2009 WL 
10484213. See also, Paul Harpur, Time to Be Heard: How Advocates Can Use the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities to Drive Change, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1271, 1295 (2011). 
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particular application to the lives of persons with disabilities.”140 It provides a 
framework for ensuring that mental health laws “fully recognises the rights of those 
with mental illness,”141 and mandates prescriptive rights in addition to proscriptive 
rights.142 There is no question that the Convention has “ushered in a new era of 
disability rights policy.”143 
 Disability is a condition that arises from “interaction with various barriers 
[that] may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis 
with others” instead of inherent limitations.144  The Convention extends existing 
human rights to take into account the specific rights experiences of persons with 
disabilities,145 calling for “respect for inherent dignity”146 and “non-
discrimination.”147 Other articles declare “freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment,”148 “freedom from exploitation, violence and 
abuse,”149 and a right to protection of the “integrity of the person.”150  Equality and 
nondiscrimination are cornerstones of the CRPD’s mission. Nations must “recognize 
that all persons are equal before and under the law,” and “prohibit all 
discrimination on the basis of disability and guarantee to persons with disabilities 
equal and effective legal protection against discrimination on all grounds.”151 The 
CRPD not only clarifies that states should not discriminate against persons with 
disabilities, but it also sets out explicitly the many steps that states must take to 
create an enabling environment so that persons with disabilities can enjoy 
authentic equality in society.152 
                                                          
140  Janet E. Lord & Michael A. Stein, Social Rights and the Relational Value of the Rights to Participate in 
Sport, Recreation, and Play,  27 B.U. INT’L L. J.  249, 256 (2009); see also Ronald McCallum, The United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Some Reflections, SOC. SCI. RES. 
NETWORK ELECTRONIC LIBR. (Mar. 2010), http://Ssrn.Com/Abstract=1563883.  
141  Bernadette McSherry, International Trends in Mental Health Laws: Introduction, 26  L. CONTEXT:  
SOCIO-LEGAL J. 1, 8 (2008).  
142  Prescriptive rights require certain conduct, whereas proscriptive rights forbid particular behavior. See 
generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Expert Testimony by Ethicists: What Should be The Norm?, 33 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 198, 200 (2005). On the significance of the inclusion of proscriptive and prescriptive 
rights in human rights treaties in general,  see Robert Quinn, Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging 
Grants of Amnesty for the Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime: Chile's New Model, 62 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 905, 920 (1994). On their significance in the CRPD context specifically, see Michael L. Perlin, 
The Significance of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – And Why It Demands the 
Creation of an Asian/Pacific Disability Rights Tribunal, ANN. REP. KANAGAWA U. INST. LEGAL STUD. 
(2014). 
143  Harpur, supra note 138, at 1295. 
144  G.A. Res. 61/106, supra note 26, at 4. 
145  Frédéric Mégret, The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or Disability 
Rights?, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 514–15 (2008); See also PERLIN, supra note 26, at 143–58. 
146  G.A. Res. 61/106, supra note 26, art. 3, ¶ A.   
147  Id. at art. 3, ¶ B. 
148  Id. at art. 15.  
149  Id. at art. 16.  
150  Id. at art. 17. 
151  Id. at art. 5.  
152  On the changes that ratifying states need to make in their domestic involuntary civil commitment laws 
to comply with Convention mandates, see Bryan Y. Lee, Note, The U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
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 Although the United States has not yet ratified the CRPD, President Obama 
signed the Convention in 2009.153 Under such circumstances, “a state’s obligations 
under it are controlled by the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties . . . which 
requires signatories ‘to refrain from acts which would defeat [the Disability 
Convention’s] object and purpose.’”154 Domestic courts in New York have thus cited 
the CRPD approvingly in cases involving guardianship matters.155 In one such case 
Surrogate Judge Kristen Booth Glen noted that that the CRPD was entitled to 
“‘persuasive weight’ in interpreting our own laws and constitutional protections.”156 
International human rights law demands—at the very least—individualized 
assessments of risk prior to the imposition of restrictions that limit the liberty of a 
patient, whether civil or forensic. By way of example, New York’s multi-tier 
system157 may run afoul of the CRPD’s Article 5, which, if interpreted broadly, could 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Persons with Disabilities and Its Impact upon Involuntary Civil Commitment of Individuals with 
Developmental Disabilities, 44  COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 393, 432–45 (2011).  See also István Hoffman 
& György Könczei, Legal Regulations Relating to the Passive and Active Legal Capacity of Persons with 
Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities in Light of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and the Impending Reform of the Hungarian Civil Code, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
143, 163–67 (2010) (discussing the application of the CRPD to capacity issues); Perlin, supra note 32 
(discussing the application of the CRPD to guardianship law); Michael L. Perlin, “There Are No Trials 
Inside the Gates of Eden”: Mental Health Courts, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, Dignity, and the Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in COERCIVE CARE: LAW AND POLICY 
193 (Bernadette McSherry & Ian Freckelton ed. 2013) (discussing the application of the CRPD to 
mental health court systems); Michael L. Perlin, “Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun”: The 
International Human Rights Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes, 46 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 301, 
305 n.19 (2013) [hereinafter Yonder] (discussing the application of the CRPD to juvenile punishment 
schemes); Michael L. Perlin & Naomi Weinstein, “Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the Woman of 
Shame”: Thinking About The Law, Shame and Humiliation , 24 SO. CAL. REV. L. & SOC’L JUST. 1 (2014) 
(discussing the application of the CRPD to shaming and humiliating practices in the mental health 
system); Kathryn D. DeMarco, Note, Disabled by Solitude: The Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities and Its Impact on The Use of Supermax Solitary Confinement, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 523, 
541–57 (2012) (discussing the application of the CRPD to solitary confinement in correctional 
institutions). . 
153  See Michelle Diament, Obama Urges Senate to Ratify Disability Treaty, DISABILITY SCOOP (May 18, 
2012), http:// www.disabilityscoop.com/2012/05/18/Obama-Urges-Senate-Treaty/15654/. The Senate 
failed to ratify the CRPD on December 4, 2012, for lack of a supermajority of votes. See U.S. Int'l' 
Council on Disabilities, http://usicd.org/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). The Democratic 
leadership promised to bring the Convention up again for ratification in 2015. See Yonder, supra note 
152. 
154  See In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 433 (Sur. 2010) (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treatises art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331), as discussed in Henry Dlugacz & Christopher 
Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with Limited Competency in Guardianship Proceedings,  4 
ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 331, 362–63 (2011). 
155  See, e.g., Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d at 419 (finding that due process  requires that the guardianship 
appointment be subject to a requirement of periodic reporting and review); In re Dameris L., 956 
N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sur. 2012) (finding substantive due process requirement of adherence to principal of 
least restrictive alternative applies to guardianships sought for mentally retarded persons). 
156  Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S. 2d at 855. See Perlin, supra note 32, at 1178 n.97 (discussing Dameris L. in this 
context). 
157  See supra text accompanying notes 45–50. 
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prohibit all discrimination against individuals with disabilities.158 In practice, 
individuals with conditions predetermined to pose a risk can be transferred to a 
more secure facility without a full due process hearing.159 Article 5 of the CRPD 
may provide a basis on which to claim that it is improper to discriminate based on 
the type of diagnosed disability, and that all transfers, regardless of diagnosed 
conditions, warrant a full due process hearing. 
 In fact, strong arguments have been made that international human rights 
law calls into question all currently-existing domestic civil commitment schemes, 
especially if involuntary treatment is a possible “side product” of such 
commitment.160 The UN’s Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has, 
in a general comment, stated that “forced treatment . . .  is a violation of [Articles 
15, 16 and 17 of the CRPD].”161 The same Committee has characterized the 
segregation of persons with disabilities in institutions as “a pervasive and insidious 
problem that violates a number of rights guaranteed under the Convention.”162 An 
annual report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is similarly quite 
clear: “Legislation authorizing the institutionalization of persons with disabilities 
on the grounds of their disability without their free and informed consent must be 
abolished.”163 The international framework has now been put in place by the UN 
and those nations that have ratified the CRPD. It now falls to the individual 
nations and courts to uphold these mandates in case law and put into practice what 
is so clearly expressed in the CRPD: individuals with disabilities are entitled to give 
                                                          
158  Lee, supra note 152, at 429. On the need for all participants in the forensic system to understand the 
significance of international human rights as they affect cases of persons with mental disabilities, see 
Michael L. Perlin & Valerie McClain, “Where Souls Are Forgotten”: Cultural Competencies, Forensic 
Evaluations and International Human Rights,  15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &  L. 257, 258 (2009). 
159  E.g., Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. ex rel. Aliza K. v. Ford, 705 N.E.2d 1191, 1194 (1998). 
160  This is clearly contemplated under New York case law. See, e.g., Ernst J. v. Stone, 452 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 
2006); In re Eric U., 835 N.Y.S. 2d 518 ( N.Y. App. Div. 2007). 
161  United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Comm. on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1 ¶ 42,  (2014), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/031/20/PDF/G1403120.pdf?OpenElement.    
162  Id. ¶ 46. 
163  Annual Report of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights & Reports of the Office of the High Comm’r 
and the Secretary-General, Thematic Study by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on enhancing awareness and understanding of the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/48 (Jan. 26, 2009). See also Interim Report of the Special 
Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. A/63/175 (July 28, 2008) (“Many States, with or without a legal basis, 
allow for the detention of persons with mental disabilities in institutions without their free and 
informed consent, on the basis of the existence of a diagnosed mental disability often together with 
additional criteria such as being a ‘danger to oneself and others’ or in ‘need of treatment.’ The Special 
Rapporteur recalls that article 14 of CRPD prohibits unlawful or arbitrary deprivation of liberty and 
the existence of a disability as a justification for deprivation of liberty.”).  
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consent on institutionalization, a critical matter affecting their freedom and 
liberties.164 
 There is limited relevant case law from the inter-regional human rights 
courts and commissions, but what little case law does exist supports the arguments 
set forth in this Article. In Case of Furlan and Family v. Argentina,165 a case 
involving a fourteen-year-old who suffered from permanent brain damage as a 
result of an accident on a field that was the property of the Argentinean army, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in ordering reparations and equitable 
relief, relied on the CRPD for the proposition that it was “imperative” that states 
adopt “affirmative measures to “respect and ensure human rights,” “according to the 
particular protection needs” of the individual person,166 so as to “promote social 
inclusion practices.”167 The fact that, by way of example, there is no right to a 
hearing under New York’s track transfer scheme168 falls afoul of  the “affirmative 
measures” requirement mandated by the Furlan court.  
 Elsewhere, in a child care case involving a potential loss of custody of a 
premature baby on the part of a mother with learning disabilities, the European 
Court of Human Rights found that the state’s procedures provided an effective 
vehicle through which a guardian’s actions could be challenged, and thus it found no 
violation of the CRPD.169 However, in the course of its opinion, that court noted 
that, under the Convention, the state was obligated to provide “appropriate 
accommodation to facilitate disabled persons’ effective role in legal proceedings.”170 
Again, there is no evidence that such “appropriate accommodation[s]” are made in 
cases involving changes in track status in New York or parallel proceedings in other 
domestic jurisdictions.171 
 Even with mounting support in international human rights law, nations 
continue to ignore the basic rights given in the CRPD to individuals with 
disabilities. New York and other US jurisdictions have consistently failed to 
recognize the need for a more comprehensive due process system for individuals 
who are to be transferred to a secure facility. The international cases that 
appropriately recognize the rights of individuals with disabilities show that there is 
widespread recognition of the importance of giving a voice to these marginalized 
                                                          
164  On the implications of such arguments for the viability of mental status defenses in the criminal law, 
see Perlin, supra note 29 (both the incompetency status and the insanity defense are compatible with 
and required by the CRPD). 
165  Provisional Measures, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 246 (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/resumen_246_ing.pdf. 
166  Id. at 46 (emphasis added). 
167  Id. 
168  See sources cited supra note 45; see also Savastano v. Nurnberg, 548 N.Y.S.2d 555 (App. Div. 1989) 
(finding transfer from municipal acute-care facility to hospital without a hearing constitutional). 
169  See R.P. v. United Kingdom, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 22–23; Glor v. Switzerland, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 11. 
170  R.P., 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20–21. 
171  For a discussion of other European cases finding extensive human rights violations in cases involving 
persons with mental disabilities, see Perlin, supra note 32, at 1169–70. 
2017] “Toiling in the Danger and in the Morals of Despair” 433 
individuals. It is the hope of these authors that the United States follows suit and 
ends the pervasive patterns and practices of discriminatory legislation. 
 In a recent paper, one of the authors (MLP) and another co-author focused on 
six issues involving forensic patients that needed to be re-conceptualized in light of 
these developments:172 
 Although there is a robust literature on the CRPD and on the UN Convention 
against Torture, there is virtually no mention of the plight of forensic 
patients. So, even within the world of those who focus broadly on these 
human rights issues, this population has remained invisible. 
 Conditions at forensic facilities around the world continue to “shock the 
conscience,” and it is essential that any “anti-torture” publication (such as 
this one) highlight this.  
 Even when regional courts and commissions have found international human 
rights violations in cases involving forensic patients (e.g., Victor Rosario 
Congo v. Ecuador)173, the discussion of these cases largely ignores the 
plaintiffs’ statuses as forensic patients 
  There are few lawyers and fewer “mental disability advocates” providing 
legal and advocacy services to this population,  
 There is little mention in the survivor movement literature about the specific 
plight of forensic patients. 
 Forensic patients in facilities for persons with intellectual disabilities are 
particularly absent from the discourse. 174 
In the course of that paper, we argued that the treatment of forensic patients 
globally violated international human rights law principles.175 We believe that it is 
imperative that institutional administrators begin to come to grips with the 
significance of these principles for the population in question.  
A. Therapeutic Jurisprudence176 
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past two 
decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic jurisprudence 
                                                          
172  See generally Perlin & McClain, supra note 158. 
173   Case 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 63/99, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.102, doc. 6 rev., ¶ 54 (1999), discussed 
in this context in, inter alia, Michael L. Perlin, An Internet-based Mental Disability Law Program: 
Implications for Social Change in Nations with Developing Economies, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 435, 447–
48 (2007). 
174  Perlin & Schriver, supra note 5, at 201–02. 
175  Id. at 216–17. 
176   This section is partially adapted from Perlin, Wisdom, supra note 18, at 361–64, Perlin, Yonder, supra 
note 152, at 330–36, and Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “All His Sexless Patients”: Persons with 
Mental Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257, 277–79 (2014). Further, it 
distills the work of one of the co-authors (MLP) over the past two decades, beginning with Michael L. 
Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993).  
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(TJ).177 TJ recognizes that the law—potentially a therapeutic agent—can have 
therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences for individuals involved in both the 
civil and criminal justice systems.178 The critical question is whether legal rules, 
procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their 
therapeutic potential while, at the same time, not subordinating principles of due 
process?179 Professor David Wexler, one of the creators of this field of 
scholarship/theory, has been clear about this for over two decades the law’s use of 
“mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning . . . [cannot] 
imping[e] upon justice concerns,”180a position with which we entirely agree.181 
TJ “asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people’s lives,”182 focusing on 
the law’s influence on emotional life and psychological well-being.183 TJ seeks to 
inform lawyering practices and influence policy “by using social science data and 
methodology to study the extent to which a legal rule, procedure, or practice 
promotes the psychological and physical well-being of the people it affects.”184  It 
                                                          
177  See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); 
DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 6–11 (2005); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 
TOURO L. REV. 17 (2008); PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 2–6, at 2-43 to 2-66. Wexler first used the 
term in a paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental Health in 1987. See David B. Wexler, 
Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 27,  
32–33 (1992). 
178  See Michael L. Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: How Will Jurors Respond to 
Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV.  885, 912 (2009); Kate Diesfeld & 
Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN 
HEALTH LAW 91 (Ian Freckelton & Kate Peterson eds. 2006) (offering a transnational perspective). 
179  See Perlin, supra note 6, at 510 n.139; Perlin, supra note 10, at 719 n.195. On how therapeutic 
jurisprudence “might be a redemptive tool in efforts to combat sanism, as a means of ‘strip[ping] bare 
the law's sanist façade,’” see Michael L. Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror”: The Legal  Profession’s 
Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 591 (2008), 
quoting, in part, PERLIN, supra note 2, at 301.  See also Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 585–
86 (2008); Bernard P. Perlmutter, George's Story: Voice and Transformation through the Teaching and 
Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School Child Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
561, 599 n.111 (2005). 
180  David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993). See also, e.g., David Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 APPL. & 
PREVENT. PSYCHOL. 179 (1996). 
181   “An inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns ‘trump’ civil rights and 
civil liberties.” Perlin, supra note 99, at 412; Michael L. Perlin, Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the 
Borderline: Mental Disability Law, Theory and Practice, Us  and  Them,  31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 
(1998). 
182  Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing With Victims of Crime, 
33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).  
183  David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence:  Psycholegal Soft Spots and Strategies, in  
DENNIS P. STOLLE ET AL., eds., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 
45 (2000). 
184  Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, “Johnny’s in the Basement/Mixing up his Medicine”: Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence & Clinical Teaching, Introduction to Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Issues, Analysis, and 
Applications, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339, 353–54 (2000). See also Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic 
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mandates that “law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid 
imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent 
with other values served by law, should attempt to bring about healing and 
wellness.”185 In this context, it has been suggested that psychological health is a 
“fundamental legal interest.”186 
TJ utilizes socio-psychological insights into the law and its applications,187 
and it is also part of a growing comprehensive movement in the law toward 
establishing more humane and psychologically optimal ways of handling legal 
issues collaboratively, creatively, and respectfully.188  TJ has thus been described 
as “a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law . . .  a movement towards 
a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law . . . which emphasise[s] 
psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism.”189  TJ thus supports an 
ethic of care.190 
TJ and its practitioners place great importance on the principle of a 
commitment to dignity.191 Professor Amy Ronner describes the “three Vs”: voice, 
validation and voluntariness,192 arguing: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 193, 197 (1995) (TJ “adopt[s] a 
preference for laws that promote well-being”). 
185  Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in INVOLUNTARY 
DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL  PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 
26 (Kate Diesfeld &  Ian Freckelton eds., 2003). 
186  Douglas B. Marlowe et al., A Sober Assessment of Drug Courts, 16 FED. SENT’G REP., 153, 155 (2003). 
187  Diesfeld & Freckelton, supra note 178, at 582.  
188  Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within the Comprehensive Law Movement, in 
PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION, supra note 183, at 465.  On 
the relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence, procedural justice and restorative justice, see 
generally PERLIN, supra note 12. 
189  Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. & MED. 328, 
329–30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Settlement: Challenges 
for the TJ Lawyer, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING 
PROFESSION 341 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 
13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605–06 (2006). The use of the phrase dates to CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT 
VOICE 73 (1982).  
190  See, e.g., Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A “Therapeutic” Approach to Enriching 
Clinical Legal Education Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 385 (2006); Brookbanks, supra note 
189; David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor 
Quinn's Concerns about Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 
599 (2007); Winick & Wexler, supra note 189, at 605–07. 
On the explicit link between TJ and the notion of “ethic of care,” see Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Be Thyself: 
An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship between the Ethic of Care, the Feeling Decisionmaking 
Preference, and Lawyer Wellbeing, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 87, 122 n.234 (2008); Susan Daicoff, 
Making Law Therapeutic For Lawyers: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law, and the Psychology 
of Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y. & L. 811 (1999). 
191  See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 161 (2005). See 
generally PERLIN, supra note 12; Perlin, “There Are No Trials Inside the Gates of Eden,” supra note 152. 
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What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of voice or 
a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal 
has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant’s story, the litigant 
feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a 
sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and 
validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant 
experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of 
litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the end 
result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate 
healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In general, human beings 
prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least participating in, their own 
decisions.193 
The question to be posed here is this: to what extent are the practices and 
procedures discussed in this paper consonant with TJ? Do they best ensure that 
these principles written about by Professor Ronner—the principles of voluntariness, 
voice, and validation—be fulfilled in matters involving residents of forensic 
institutions? Certainly, there is little about what happens that is voluntary on the 
part of the patients; maximum security facilities bespeak involuntariness in se.194 
There is little evidence that the patients in question have much of a voice (if at all) 
in their treatment or in the conditions of their confinement.195 Although we know 
that fairness and procedural justice inevitably increase compliance with court 
orders,196 we also know that procedural justice is often solely lacking in all forensic 
facility decision making.197 One of us (MLP), in writing some years ago about sexual 
autonomy in psychiatric hospitals, concluded, “Much of the case law ignores forensic 
patients entirely.”198 So do the developments expanding TJ concepts to 
institutionalized persons in general largely ignore forensic patients? 
At the outset, there is no evidence that there is any requirement that New 
York’s risk assessment measures comport with the ways that the behavioral 
community agrees are most likely to yield accurate and valid findings: through the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
192  Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008). On the importance 
of “voice,” see also DIESFELD & FRECKELTON, supra note 178, at 588. 
193  Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 
Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94–95 (2002). See generally AMY D. RONNER, LAW, 
LITERATURE AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (2010).  
194  Consider in this context Joel Haycock’s caution that therapeutic jurisprudence risks should not be 
considered solely from the perspective of the clinician, but, rather, from the “perspective of the objects 
of the mental health law.” Joel Haycock, Speaking Truth to Power: Rights, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 
and Massachusetts Mental Health Law, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 301, 317 (1994). 
195  On the question of, for example, the freedom of sexual autonomy in forensic facilities, see generally, 
Perlin, supra note 6; MICHAEL L. PERLIN & ALISON J. LYNCH, SEXUALITY, DISABILITY, AND THE LAW: 
BEYOND THE LAST FRONTIER? (2016). 
196  Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 9, at 69 (citing Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter?: 
The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 163, 160 (1997)). 
197  See, e.g., Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. 842, 874–878 (N.D. Ohio 1987).  
198  Perlin, supra note 6, at 488. 
2017] “Toiling in the Danger and in the Morals of Despair” 437 
use of the sort of structured risk assessment instruments urged by Professor 
Monahan and his colleagues.199 In an assessment of the potential value of TJ in the 
rehabilitation of persons with severe mental illness, William Spaulding and his 
colleagues stress that “everyone is best served when the determinations of risk upon 
which restrictive interventions are based must be as accurate, precise, and complete 
as clinical technology allows.”200 
This sort of assessment was specifically endorsed by the late Professor Bruce 
Winick—one of the two original “fathers” of TJ—in an article he wrote about 
applying the law therapeutically in domestic violence cases, one that relies 
extensively on Professor Monahan’s work.201 The risk management model, Prof. 
Winick noted, is supported by the principles of TJ, providing an individual with 
incentives through which “to modify his behavior in order to reduce the extent or 
restrictiveness of the conditions imposed by the court”; 202 such a model also 
provides incentives, Winick argues, to “minimize or avoid the interferences with 
[individuals’] liberty that are justified as a result of the determination that they are 
dangerous.”203 Beyond this, Professor Spaulding and his colleagues—in line with, 
though chronologically pre-dating, Professor Ronner’s call for “voice”—conclude 
that, “If patients can become more involved in the risk evaluation itself, then 
patients’ involvement in treatment can be fostered; thus more compliance with 
treatment and aftercare planning can be expected in the long run,”204 and they note 
that, “At the very least, involving patients in risk evaluations does not appear to 
have anti-therapeutic consequences.”205 There is, to the best of our knowledge, no 
such patient involvement in the New York system. With the stated outcome as 
treatment and recovery, it only makes sense that individuals are included and 
engaged in matters involving their hospitalization.206 Jurisdictions that choose not 
                                                          
199  It is telling that there is not a single reported New York case that cites to Professor Monahan’s 
research on risk assessment. 
200  William Spaulding, Jeffrey Poland, Eric Elbogen & A. Jocelyn Ritchie, Applications of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence in Rehabilitation for People with Severe and Disabling Mental Illness, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. 
REV. 135, 161–62 (2000). On the need for therapeutic jurisprudence and international human rights 
principles to be integrated in the treatment of offenders, see Astrid Birgden, Maximizing Desistance: 
Adding Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Human Rights to the Mix, 42 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19 (2015). 
201  Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV. 33 
(2000). 
202  Id. at 58. 
203  Id. at 53. 
204  Spaulding et al., supra note 200, at 169. 
205  Id. 
206  See Ronner, supra note 192, at 94–95 (on the need for “voice”). In a recent article about dignity and the 
civil commitment process, Professors Jonathan Simon and Stephen Rosenbaum embrace therapeutic 
jurisprudence as a modality of analysis, and focus specifically on this issue of voice: “When procedures 
give people an opportunity to exercise voice, their words are given respect, decisions are explained to 
them their views taken into account, and they substantively feel less coercion.” Jonathan Simon & 
Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Dignifying Madness: Rethinking Commitment Law in an Age of Mass 
Incarceration, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 51 (2015). It is important to consider how this “plays out” in the 
context of what is discussed in this paper.  
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to allow patient involvement should recognize the therapeutic benefits of giving a 
patient a stake in his recovery. Not only will it provide that patient with a voice, but 
it will also lead to better aggregate data in risk assessments, since the cooperation 
of a patient greatly increases the kind of information gained in risk evaluations and 
allows for a more individualized assessment.207 Finally, a turn to TJ principles will 
make it more likely that the international human rights principles discussed here 
will be privileged.208 
CONCLUSION / RECOMMENDATIONS 
In general, many courts in the United States continue to rely on imperfect 
and potentially prejudicial risk assessment measures to make determinations about 
a patient’s appropriate, and least restrictive, setting for continued treatment. While 
some courts lag behind on recognizing the dangers (to the patients) that may arise 
from improper determinations of a patient’s risk, New York has proven itself 
somewhat ahead of many other state courts. When taken together, the New York 
Court of Appeals decisions in this area form a partially coherent body of case law. 
We say “partially coherent,” however, because there are important gaps in this 
statement of the law: how do we determine and define “dangerousness” in this 
context, and how do we contextualize this definition with (1) the constitutional 
requirements of the LRA and (2) the demonstrated invalidity of unstructured 
interviews? Although there is an important database of cases (all from other 
jurisdictions) that consider the positive attributes of structured interviews, these all 
deal with assessment of alleged sexually violent predators and persons with anti-
social personality disorders, not institutional placements.209 We are thus still in 
unchartered territory.  
 
 
 
                                                          
207  The mental health court model requires active participation from the individuals involved. Not only 
does this promote the therapeutic jurisprudential tenets of voice and validation, but it leads to an 
overall improvement in services and long-term outcomes when those individuals are fully involved in 
their case services and treatment plans. See Ginger Lerner Wren, Mental Health Courts: Serving 
Justice and Promoting Recovery, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 577, 587 (2010) (“Participation in 
the mental health court will result in comparatively fewer episodes of re-incarcerations and better 
access to health care.”); see generally, Michael L. Perlin, “The Judge, He Cast His Robe Aside”: Mental 
Health Courts, Dignity and Due Process, 3 MENT. HEALTH L. & POL’Y  J. 1 (2013). 
208  See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “The Ladder of the Law Has No Top and No Bottom”: How Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Can Give Life to International Human Rights, 37 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 535 (2014);  
Perlin, supra note 30; see also Simon & Rosenbaum, supra note 206, at 36–41 (discussing the 
international human rights implications of involuntary civil commitment policies). 
209  See, e.g., United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 815 (4th Cir. 2000) (Psychopathy Checklist Revised 
[“PCL-R”] admissible); Lee v. State, 854 So. 2d 709, 711–12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Rapid Risk 
Assessment for Sex Offense Recidivism [“RRASOR”], Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised 
[“MnSOST-R”], PCL-R, Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide [“SORAG”], and Violence Risk Appraisal 
Guide [“VRAG”] admissible), as cited in Monahan, Forecasting, supra note 102, at 408–09 n.71. 
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 So, what should be done? Here are some recommendations: 
 It is absolutely essential that the LRA principles be considered 
in every case. As the highest court in the United States has 
routinely upheld a patient’s right to be treated in the least 
restrictive environment,210 it should be regarded as legally 
operative in determining the actual placement of all patients. 
Freedom from a secure facility or an allegedly non-secure facility 
that has increasingly become secure is a right guaranteed by the 
concept of the LRA, when appropriate for the particular patient, 
and must considered in each case as a unique and 
individualized determination.  
 It is absolutely essential that each state develop a mechanism 
through which organized, dedicated counsel is available to all 
forensic patients.211 
 It is absolutely essential that decision-makers familiarize 
themselves with the bases of international human rights law so 
as to insure that the rights guaranteed by the CRPD are applied 
to all forensic patients. 
 It is absolutely essential that decision-makers familiarize 
themselves with the basic principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence so as to best insure that the three principles 
articulated by Professor Ronner—voice, voluntariness and 
validation—be honored in forensic facilities. 
 Finally, it is absolutely essential that all persons doing clinical 
evaluations familiarize themselves with John Monahan’s recent 
writings on dangerousness predictions, on the failure of 
unstructured interviews, and on the need to use structured risk 
assessment tools. 
We believe that if clinicians take these recommendations seriously, many of 
the dilemmas we have been discussing will be ameliorated. It is impossible for us to 
achieve meaningful mitigating change in our mental disability law system unless 
we begin to take these issues seriously and to re-envision the way we regulate the 
                                                          
210  See supra text accompanying notes 65–72. 
211  See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral, My Trial: Global 
Perspective on Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment Cases, and Its 
Implications for Clinical Legal Education, 28 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 241, 242 (2008) (saying it is clear 
that “only in those jurisdictions that had dedicated counsel programs was there any coherent body of 
reported civil commitment case law.”); PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 6-4.2 at 6-53 (“It appears 
beyond dispute that an organized and regularized scheme for providing . . . counsel comes closest to 
guaranteeing at least minimally adequate counsel.”).  
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practice of mental disability law (especially, though not exclusively, institutional 
mental disability law) using these tools of legal change.212    
We conclude by reconsidering both parts of our title. Clearly, the “clinician’s 
dilemma” is a real one. Balancing the factors of “risk,” “security,” and “danger” with 
“constitution[al]” mandates is not an easy task. But it is one that must be done. And 
for the lyric: some may be puzzled why we chose a song that is about “isolation, 
desolation and failure.”213 But we think the line in question resonates in this 
context. This work—the assessment of “danger”—can certainly feel like “toiling.” 
But also the remainder of the phrase—“the morals of despair”—is just as relevant. 
This work can inspire feelings of “despair.” But it must be infused with a sense of 
“moral[ity]” as well. And we believe that, the incorporation of these 
recommendations into this work, will, in the long run, lessen the level of “despair.”  
                                                          
212  See generally Perlin, supra note 207. 
213  OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 181 (2004). 
